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The Science Before the War

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The Science Before the War

The New Atlantis March 1, 2020
Energy & EnvironmentTechnology / Infrastructure

How the technological feats of World War II grew out of curiosity-driven research

World War II shapes how we think about science today more than does any other historical event of the last century, except perhaps for the Moon landing. Hiroshima and Nagasaki in particular stand as images — both awe-inspiring and horrific — of the raw power of scientific discovery. They have come to illustrate the profound stakes of the partnership between science and technology, and the partnership between science and government. With our growing scientific knowledge of nature, what technologies should we focus on developing? And what is the role of government in deciding this question — in regulating scientific research and directing it toward particular ends? There are no clearer examples than the Manhattan Project, and its direct descendant, the Apollo Program, of large-scale organized research, and of the government’s effectiveness in funding it and even steering it toward technological application — a collection of practices that historians have come to call “Big Science.”

Today, policymakers commonly call for “Manhattan projects” or “moonshots” to conquer major societal and technological challenges, from cancer to climate change. It has become part of the legacy of Big Science that the public image of scientists, as historian Clarence G. Lasby put it, “has generally been that of ‘miracle workers,’” a “prestigious image [that] has been translated into heightened political power and representation at the highest levels in government.” A number of iconic technologies were invented during World War II — including not just the atomic bomb but radar and the computer — in part owing to research sponsored and initiated by the government. Thus, many now see the iconic inventions of the war as offering this lesson: To accomplish great technological feats, we need government not only to fund research but also to direct research programs toward practical goals. Furthermore, so the argument goes, we must not waste funds on undirected, curiosity-driven science; its results are too often unpredictable, unusable, and even unreliable.

Continue reading the entire piece here at The New Atlantis (paywall)


M. Anthony Mills is director of science policy at the R Street Institute. Mark P. Mills is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, and a faculty fellow at the McCormick School of Engineering at Northwestern University.

Photo by Hulton Archive/Getty Images