



HARD WON LESSONS:
THE NEW PARADIGM—MERGING LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES



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Safe Cities Editor

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The Safe Cities Initiative

The tragedy of 9/11 demonstrated that globalization has changed our security as much as it has changed our economy. In this new threat-environment, all of our domestic-security institutions must be transformed. It is especially vital that this transformation occur in America's cities, which are high-value targets for terrorists.

The Manhattan Institute, reflecting its longstanding and unique policy focus on urban issues, is committed to developing and disseminating ideas which will make our cities more secure in this dangerous new world. Accordingly, the Institute's Safe Cities Initiative assists state and local law-enforcement in:

- Learning and applying the hard-won lessons of 9/11 and the war on terrorism, in order to deter, detect, and prevent future attacks.
- Assessing the current, evolving, and future dynamics of the threat posed by international terrorist groups in particular police jurisdictions.
- Sharing intelligence between jurisdictions.
- Enhancing and refining existing intelligence capabilities, and creating new ones.
- Integrating private-sector capabilities, including industrial and corporate security assets.
- Operating with and in local communities, especially immigrant communities, both to effectively root out terrorists in this country, and to defend high-risk immigrant communities from crimes of bias.
- Administering the Counterterrorism Information Sharing Consortium, which includes representatives of over twenty northeast law enforcement agencies.

The findings of the Initiative are published periodically in variety of media. Working-group white-papers, and published conference-proceedings, provide policymakers, analysts, and security professionals with usable, durable knowledge.

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Introduction: Hometown Security in an Age of Global Threats

State and local police operate today in a new and strangely dangerous world. Law-enforcement officers confront threats more technologically complex, and geographically diverse, than any they have ever faced. Although militant Islam is the most widely publicized new threat, it thrives within a wider dissatisfaction with American values, brought home to Main-Street America by globalization.

Globalization is a trend with many gurus; not all have been wise. Some, writing during the economic euphoria of the Clinton years, predicted that global trade would translate into global peace. In *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, Thomas Friedman even dismissed terrorists like Ramzi Youssef, architect of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, as ineffectual "Yahoos" who were not the wave of the future. We know now that the Ramzi Youssefs of the world are not ineffectual; that they will threaten us for decades to come; and that they will seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction and use them against us.

We know too that globalization is a permanent fact. The international economy is the engine of our nation, and the source of our wealth. This means more for law enforcement than is generally realized, even now. It means more than just police working new beats like container security, seaport security, airport security. It means that all the physical and conceptual walls associated with the modern, sovereign state—the walls that divide domestic from international, the police from the military, intelligence from law enforcement, war from peace, and crime from war—are coming down. It means, in short, that *police response to the new threats must be shaped by globalization, as surely as are the threats themselves.*

The realities of globalization can be seen in something as simple as the investigation of a car crash. If a patrolman investigated a fatal accident in the 1970s, the victims and the witnesses were both likely from the local community; and if the officer climbed into the wreckage, to look for some malfunction in the vehicle, he would probably see from the serial numbers that the car was made in the U.S. He could put all that together, and make his case.

But let's fast-forward to recent times, and consider the crash that killed Lady Diana. This accident involved an English princess, with an Egyptian boyfriend, crashed in a French tunnel, driving a German car with a Dutch engine, driven by a Belgian, who was drunk on Scotch whiskey, followed closely by Italian paparazzi, on Japanese motorcycles, and finally treated with Brazilian medicines by an American doctor. In this case, even leaving aside the fame of the victims, a mere neighborhood canvass would hardly have completed the forensic picture, as it might have a generation before.

Yet the change runs deeper still. The very notion of a local community is being transformed. Thirty years ago, few police chiefs had to protect multinational corporations in their municipalities. Today, many chiefs must secure the underpinnings of the most sophisticated economy on earth. The vast majority of this economy is not only in private hands, but also protected by private hands. If the need for police to partner with the private sector is therefore clear, the forms of these partnerships are still being forged. If sending a police cruiser to drive by DuPont headquarters won't do much to prevent a terrorist attack, then what exactly should police be doing to protect Dupont? How should they be working with DuPont's own security element? What questions should officers be asking to assess the new threats to this newly configured community? What methods should they be using to glean the answers?

The difficulty of meeting these new challenges underscores an old dynamic. Police are really supposed to be doing one thing, protecting the public. But to do that one thing, police must actually do, *and be*, many things. The expectations placed on officers have never been closer to what August Vollmer, the early 20th-century police chief in Berkeley, California, famously said about what the citizenry expects of police: The patience of Job, the diplomacy of Lincoln, the tolerance of the Carpenter of Nazareth, and an intimate knowledge of every branch of natural, biological and social science. If an officer has all these things, the saying goes, he just might be a good policeman.

How does a local police officer get all these things and use them in an age of global threats? For three years, under the aegis of the Safe Cities Initiative, law enforcement leaders throughout the United States have been meeting to consider this question. This document distills what they have learned. It describes how state and local police are merging crime-control and counterterrorism models in their daily work, creating a new paradigm for policing. Ed Flynn, chief of the Massachusetts State Police, calls it "hometown security."

The New Paradigm

The causes of terrorism are certainly far beyond the capacity of American law enforcement to address. The question is, what can state and local police do about terrorism in practice? What can they do to alter the environment that must exist in order for an act of terrorism to occur?

Dr. George Kelling has persuasively argued that police can prevent terrorism with many of the same mechanisms they've developed over the last twenty years to prevent crime. Among these mechanisms are problem solving, intelligence-led policing, environmental design, community policing, and public-private partnerships.

Problem Solving

"Police prevention in counterterrorism, as in other areas, should be systemic," says Major Timothy Connors, Director of the Center for Policing Terrorism. Terrorism should be viewed, not as a set of isolated incidents to be responded to, but as a special class of problem, which police activity must be organized to prevent and pre-empt.

Intelligence-Led Policing

Israeli policing offers a useful case for emulation. Many U.S. police chiefs have sent officers to Israel, to ride on traffic stops and investigate crimes with the Israeli National Police in Tel Aviv. U.S. police observers have been impressed to find that "investigation of the incident" is secondary to the number one goal—which is gathering intelligence. For instance, when they raided a bordello, where the patrons were primarily Arabs from different parts of the region, Israeli police were less concerned about the criminal activity, than with preparing intelligence reports on who these people were, and how they got into Israel. "They put this all into a system and are able to collate it," notes an observing officer from the LAPD.

Community Policing

Police must rededicate themselves to maintaining amicable relationships with immigrant communities, whose cooperation and trust are needed in fighting terrorists. To that end, state and

local police can receive training from authorities in other countries that have gained the trust of their Arab or Islamic communities. Within these communities, posits one expert in social research, are "substantial numbers of people who, if they knew somebody was really intending to blow up a building, would drop a dime pretty quickly." For that reason, as British prime minister Tony Blair has rightly said of Islamic terrorism, "In the end this can only be taken on and defeated by the community itself."

Partnerships with the Private Sector

The concept of a "community" must be conceived more broadly in preventing terrorism than in preventing ordinary crime. In counterterrorism, the community includes private-sector infrastructure and multinational corporations. Security policymakers must encourage partnerships not only with private citizens, but with business leaders and corporate-security chiefs.

As 9/11 and other major attacks have shown, terrorism is no longer merely a political and a media phenomenon, but an economic one. The potential economic impact of terrorism offers police an opening to engage the business community in conversations covering not only terrorism, but street crime and neighborhood security.

Atlanta is among the cities which have moved aggressively on this public-private, dual-purpose front. Once a month, the leadership of the Atlanta police meets at its headquarters to share homeland security information with the security directors of the city's hotels, universities, and major corporations, such as CNN, Coca Cola, and Delta Airlines. Police brief the attendees about what is happening in the world, and describe the kind of intelligence they're receiving. This dialogue has made the business community more conscious about the security of its buildings, and has helped reduce office burglaries and other crimes.

Environmental Design

Many opportunities for partnership with the private sector are offered by critical infrastructure protection through environmental design. Although initiatives in this area have been well funded by government, video surveillance—for private infrastructure as well as public infrastructure—is among the techniques which can be used more effectively.

The city of London offers a useful model. London has over 40,000 closed-circuit cameras on its public streets, and keeps the tapes from these cameras for 30 days. The cameras are owned by private merchants, but the tapes are made available to the police. If a crime occurs in a particular area, police will identify the grid, and examine the tapes from all the private merchants in it. Although the presence of cameras will not deter terrorists, cameras can certainly be vital in identifying and apprehending them, as the 7/7 investigations showed.

Police across many U.S. jurisdictions are already formulating protocols for the proactive use of video surveillance. Atlanta, for instance, has put cameras in and around some of its larger critical-infrastructure buildings and the more important public streets. As in London, the cameras are owned by local businesses, but the monitors are placed in police substations. In Boston, similarly, the private sector security cameras are being catalogued for the Police Department, which will be able to control a database of imagery. In addition to deterring terrorist surveillance teams, the presence of cameras has discouraged ordinary crime.

The installation of cameras in Atlanta also offers an example of how police can partner financially with the private sector. The Atlanta Police didn't put the cameras in themselves, nor did they pay for them. Rather, police leaders engaged business leaders in a dialogue. When business leaders asked what they could do to make the community safer, police suggested that they put cameras up—and told them that if they did, police would emplace the monitors in their precincts. As a result, business leaders in one section of Atlanta raised \$1 million to install video surveillance; in another, they raised about \$400,000.

State and Local Tripwires

As vital as the machinery of surveillance is the human element of it. Within a 30-mile radius of New York City, 150-plus law-enforcement agencies employ over 50,000 cops. In other regions the numbers differ, but the principle remains. A potential wealth of information on the street must be specifically channeled for counter-terrorist purposes.

Despite the inherent difficulties in identifying terrorists before they act, police are well positioned to "ask the next questions" about potential terrorists who, in preparation for their attacks, must navigate many potential "tripwires." Training police to "ask the next question" in these cases will not only increase criminal interdiction, but it may in fact garnish a terrorist as well.

Traffic Enforcement

Terrorists, like other criminals, are most vulnerable to apprehension while they are in transit. "They all have to drive - they have to get from point A to point B," as one police chief says. One obvious point of likely contact with terrorists, therefore, is traffic stops.

Roadways are, of course, a logical place for apprehension of terrorists fleeing the scene. Timothy McVeigh and Lee Harvey Oswald were both interdicted in this way (Oswald shot officer J.D. Tippitt before fleeing into a theater). But highways can also serve as a point of interdiction before terrorists strike. In Maryland the 9/11 terrorists were stopped and issued routine traffic citations. The 1993 World Trade Center bombers had also been stopped by police for traffic violations several times.

Increasing the amount of stop activity, using stealth cars or aggressive traffic enforcement, offers the chance for increased contact with terrorists and other criminals. Police in some areas are not exploiting this mechanism fully, due to profiling scandals and resulting consent decrees. Yet traffic enforcement provides a golden opportunity for contact with bad actors. Once police have made a constitutional motor-vehicle stop, they should have the ability, through training, to ask the kinds of questions that will help pinpoint terrorists.

Operation Shield

Pennsylvania gives its State Troopers special training to collect intelligence and to aggressively look for criminal violations during simple traffic stops. Operation Shield aims to help officers identify and interdict any fugitives, weapons contraband, and terrorists moving along Pennsylvania highways.

Operation Shield doesn't just focus on interstates, because the more troopers patrol on the interstate highway system, the more criminals use two-lane highways. On both interstates and smaller highways, officers are seizing more counterfeit property, ranging from bootleg CDs to knockoff designer handbags, "some of which may fund terrorist operations," a police official says. In one recent two-day Shield operation, the Pennsylvania troopers netted \$12,000 in currency, 50 criminal arrests, 7 fugitives, 2 stolen loaded weapons, \$1.5 million worth of counterfeit property, and 52 illegal aliens, including one from the terrorist watch list.

The weeklong Shield training includes modules on professional traffic stops, roadside-interview techniques, terrorist indicators, search-and-seizure law, and racial-profiling awareness. Troopers learn to focus on deceptive behavior. They also analyze recent seizures in which hidden compartments were used. On the third day of the training, officers receive instruction on terrorism, terrorist indicators, and false documents. This training has paid off: In Pennsylvania, virtually all of the domestic terrorism cases that have gone to the Joint Terrorist Task Force have come out of intelligence units within the state police.

Turnpike Inspections

Routine turnpike inspections offer an opportunity for police to sweep for bombs or radiological detonation devices. To this end, New Jersey state police operate commercial-vehicle and bus-inspection teams, with canine support and radiological monitors, on the state's main expressways.

Department of Motor Vehicles

Because most terrorists need to establish the ability to move within the country, they will come into contact with state departments of motor vehicles (DMV) to obtain a license. This provides an opportunity to apprehend potential terrorists who may be using false papers, or who may provide false information during the license-application process. State and local police can partner with the DMV in order to identify prospective terrorists at this point of contact. DMV personnel can be trained to spot false documents and to "ask the next questions" which can trigger further proactive investigation or watchlisting. Additionally, when input into to state and regional databases, DMV-collected intelligence can be exploited by analysts. Though systematic efforts in these areas may raise legitimate civil-liberties issues, police-DMV cooperation is a potentially helpful mechanism that merits serious exploration.

Immigration Violations

Although the federal government should not push immigration enforcement as an unfunded mandate on state and local police, there is an intelligence value in being aware of the immigration status of persons within one's jurisdiction. In the same way that police will know who is on probation and parole, they should also know, or be able to learn, the immigration status of persons coming into their cities or towns. Among the questions which police should be able to address more easily than they currently can:

- When is a non-U.S. citizen going to be in my area?
- What type of car is the person driving?
- Where is the person living, studying or working?

If federal immigration authorities provided this information, police could possibly do home visits, as they do for persons on probation and parole. Additionally, if someone were due to go back to the Sudan or Indonesia on July 1st, but remained in the U.S., the system should alert state or local police to investigate.

Terrorist Support Facilities

Terrorist groups use various facilities to plan and execute their attacks. Parcel, package, delivery services, mass transportation, hotel, motel, storage locker, and vehicle rental companies and systems have all been vital to terrorists in their known attacks and plots. Police need to cultivate informants in all of these entities. The New Jersey and Delaware State Police are proactively involved in bus stations, train stations, rental car agencies, and marine terminals. Interaction with personnel in these locations gives police a chance to educate them on what to look for.

Ordinary Crimes and Suspicious Behavior

Views vary on the extent to which terrorists will commit ordinary crimes to finance their activities. Although some terrorists have engaged in credit-card fraud and drug dealing to support themselves, many terrorist funds have also been raised by donations diverted through mosques and "charitable" organizations, and terrorist tactics frequently change.

In any case, terrorists will often come into contact with law enforcement, even for minor criminal offenses. For instance, two of the 7/7 London bombers were known to the police, despite initial reports that they were "clean skins." Shehzad Tanweer was arrested for disorderly behavior, and Hasib Hussain was questioned for shoplifting. In short, no incident should be considered too minor for interaction with potential terrorists and for the collection of intelligence.

The incident need not be a criminal one. Police or private security may note what seems merely "suspicious" behavior on public, or in some cases, private property. Noncriminal loitering, for instance, may be an indicator of terrorist reconnaissance. In one case, a terrorist operative sat for many hours in a Starbucks, in Newark, New Jersey, mapping out what would have been an attack against the Prudential building across the street.

Regional Intelligence Centers

The collection of intelligence on potential terrorists is of little help unless it is collated and made available to those who can exploit it.

Although the need to share data is not new, exchanging information across jurisdictions and levels of government is more critical in the current threat environment than it ever was in the war on crime. Unless police were dealing with narcotics conspiracies or organized crime, what they previously needed to know about crime in their cities didn't depend upon federal and state partnerships. Integrating state and local police into a national antiterrorism strategy, by contrast, requires real connection between federal and local law enforcement.

Information must be shared not only vertically, between localities and federal government, but horizontally, between localities. An officer in the Rockland County, New York street-crimes desk,

for instance, recently noticed an increase in the number of day laborers driving motor vehicles with Virginia license plates. Investigation revealed that the migrant workers had a contact in the Fairfax County, Virginia, Department of Motor Vehicles, from whom they were improperly receiving driver's licenses and vehicle registrations. Fairfax County pursued the case, which resulted in a number of convictions. This is exactly the kind of inter-jurisdictional cooperation required to interdict potential terrorists who engage in identification fraud.

The emerging mechanism for sharing intelligence of this kind is the "regional intelligence center." In many cases, state police are well positioned to manage these facilities, because they generally have more administrative functions than local police. Although state-police agencies once had a reputation of "standing alone behind the closed doors," the old walls are coming down and they are coming down quickly. Interlinked state (and in some cases, city or county) fusion centers are becoming indispensable components of a nationwide ability to deal with regional crime and terrorist trends.

All-Programs Analysis

Although regional intelligence centers focus on terrorism, they also apply what the FBI terms "all-programs intelligence analysis." Each fusion center has a criminal-analysis as well as a terrorism-analysis component. The objective is to merge the reporting from a variety of sources:

- Intelligence-community information, i.e., from CIA, NSA, FBI, DHS.
- The results of various criminal investigations conducted throughout the country.
- Suspicious-activity reports.
- Tips from the general public.
- The private sector, especially from the financial sector.
- Policing throughout the state.

Intelligence-Collection Requirements

To get these data, fusion centers must generate intelligence-collection requirements. These requirements typically take the form of bulletins to the various providers of intelligence.

A proactive stance is vital. As intelligence *consumers*, state and local police must learn to ask for what they want. Equally importantly, as intelligence *producers*, they must think of what others need. Where a detective in the 1970s could discard information that wasn't relevant to a case, he must now think of who else might need to know about it.

Technology for Intelligence-Led Policing

Disseminating intelligence in a timely way presents a challenge to all members of the law-enforcement community, but especially to managers of regional intelligence centers. Although the centers will ideally be linked to the Department of Homeland Security, the ability of state systems to "touch" federal systems is complicated by federal standards for "secure technical capabilities." The president and the United States Congress have directed that an information-sharing environment be developed in the next two years, under the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. In the

meantime, getting information from fusion centers to officers on the street is an easier hurdle for many states to overcome.

Mobile Display Terminals

To push data from regional intelligence hubs to cops in the field, many police are equipping patrol cars with mobile data terminals (MDTs).

The New Jersey State Police have been among the leaders in this area. Any terrorist alert goes to every single New Jersey trooper in uniform in almost real time—"it actually flashes on their computer so they know they have to go into the information command and actually draw out information," one state police official says. Among the additional virtues of the MDTs, the official emphasizes, is that

you also have e-mail that comes right in from the MDTs. If you think something is unusual, if you have some ID and are not really sure who you're dealing with, you just punch it in and it goes right into the intelligence center, and it's given priority. If you're on a motor vehicle stop in Atlantic City, and you stop an individual who is acting suspicious, and you're looking at him perhaps for a burglary, but you don't have probable cause to move further, and you let him go, and then he pops up in Patterson the next week, and a police officer asks for a check, then they're going to link up that Atlantic City information with your Patterson information.

Data Mining

The use of sophisticated computer software to make connections between suspects in different states offers both potentials and pitfalls. The Matrix program was abandoned by some states because of legal concerns about connectivity to other states. Yet one officer familiar with the software says:

It is an unbelievable tool. Using Matrix, an investigator could go to an analyst or a team of analysts and say, "Put this information together for me on this group of suspects." Within minutes the investigator would have that information, where previously it would have taken weeks or months. ... Ten years from now when they look back at data mining, they're going to say, Gosh, we had this capability ten years ago, with Matrix, and we got our eyes punched out, and now they're doing it across the country. We know that's the way it's going to happen. It's the wave of the future.

Although the Matrix pilot-program has been abandoned, many states are still tapping the same resources, but under a different name, "and not accessing certain things that the Matrix program did through connectivity to other states." The New Jersey State Police, for instance, are using their Memex system to query proprietary data and commercial databases.

Growing Your Own Analysts

As great as technology is, the human factor is more important. Technology can put police over the top, if they're doing everything else right. But as one leader of the LAPD's counterterrorism effort has put it: "If we rely on the machines, we lose."

Making sense of intelligence requires personnel with a strong core of analytical skill. This skill requires more than putting together link charts. It requires background investigation, proper attention to the surrounding environment, and in some cases, knowing the history and culture of the Middle East. In other words, intelligence cannot be interpreted in a vacuum. Just as police on the street need training to ask the right questions, so, too, analysts in fusion centers need training to identify and prioritize intelligence, so that it can be pushed to police on the street.

State and local police cannot wait for the FBI to impart this analytical expertise. Because this strategic analytical capability is not yet present in FBI field offices, state and local police must develop it themselves. Police leaders are, however, finding their own way to impart this expertise. New Jersey, for instance, is working with Rutgers University to its start own analytical training program. The training will cover not just terrorism, but street crime, narcotics, and other problems confronted by intelligence-led policing.

"We did this two years ago with DNA chemists after they got knocked off by the New York City Medical Examiner, who pilfered about 40 of our chemists," a New Jersey law-enforcement official explains. "We decided we had to start growing our own, and did so in conjunction with the College of New Jersey, where DNA chemists would do their three years in a classroom setting, and in the last year we deputized these Ph.Ds in their DNA labs, and they come out certified. With the intelligence analysts, we will start the [federal] top secret clearance process at the end of their junior year, when they are still carrying intern-type status."

Centers of Excellence

Police agencies which are new to intelligence analysis can benefit from the knowledge of more experienced agencies.

- New York City has perhaps had more interactions with terrorists than any police department in the country. The NYPD's Intelligence Division and Counter-Terrorism Bureau have begun offering limited training to police in other jurisdictions.
- The New York State Police, which has a strong analytical corps, has opened its intelligence centers to visiting police from other areas.
- The LAPD has an experienced group of analysts, which includes Arabic-language specialists.
- The Center for Policing Terrorism, at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, specializes in imparting counterterrorist expertise from the academic community and foreign governments to state and local police.
- The government of Israel has welcomed police from all over the U.S. for training and exchange visits. Georgia, for instance, has a special program which sends 15 law enforcement executives to Israel for two weeks each year. In return, Israel sends 15 high-ranking commanders to Georgia, where they have the chance to visit all the police departments within the state. "It's proved very helpful to us," a senior police official in Atlanta says, "because we've learned a lot about how the Israelis deal with terrorism, how they protect their aircraft, how they protect their airports, how they use bomb dogs, and so many other things."

Case Study: Imparting Counter-Terrorist Expertise in Rhode Island

About five days after 9/11, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft launched an initiative to ensure that state and local law enforcement were receiving the best available information on counterterrorism from the Department of Justice. The Department started hearing from the police departments that "we'd love to be involved in this terrorism thing but we don't know what to look for." As a result, the attorney general's office created Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils, which made limited funds available to U.S. attorneys' offices for increasing terrorist awareness among state and local police.

The U.S. Attorney's office in Rhode Island used this money to sponsor training sessions, bringing in national experts to talk about terrorism prevention. "We started doing a two-hour training session for police departments around the state, whoever could send police officers," a member of the Rhode Island U.S. Attorney's office recalls. "Basically we were telling local street cops how to recognize suspicious activity while they're in their jurisdictions on patrol—from the videotaping, the casing, the types of things that they've been reading in the press, to the types of things experienced in Newark, New York City and Washington, D.C. We also started talking to them about recruitment issues, ideology, on how these things have happened. In other words, not just the terrorists coming into the community to case us, or recruiters and people from overseas looking for operatives in this country, but the terrorists living among us.

"Through this training and through bi-monthly meetings, we encouraged these police officers to go out to make contacts in their community, and to come back to us with anything that they found suspicious. And we've continued guiding them with indicators, through regular bulletins and incidents that we highlight each month."

The Providence Police Department became a principal player in this initiative. Providence police partnered with the U.S. Attorney's office and with the private security industry, not just in Providence, but the entire state, to start running regular training sessions. Over 15 months, they trained 80% of the Providence Police Department in four-hour sessions. At the same time, they brought in all the private security departments that wanted to send people, including university police chiefs and their officers.

"What we found was happening at these training sessions was they weren't only training, but they became information-sharing sessions," a leader of the initiative says. "Because not only would we continually change the training as new information would come to us, but police officers would stand up in the training sessions and say, 'You know, we had something like that happen to us about six months ago and we had no idea or no clue that we should maybe connect that to a possible terrorist conspiracy.'

"There was one specific stop in the City of West Warwick going back almost two years ago now, even before they really got ramped up in the training. A police officer did a normal traffic stop on two white males. At the end of the traffic stop, the police officers went above and beyond, because they noticed Arabic writings, and some indications of connections to the radical Muslim community, which seemed to link these individuals to an organization outside of Rhode Island that had ties to a state penitentiary, and was part of a black Muslim group with associations to al-Qaeda. The officers took all the information they could get and they even downloaded all of the phone numbers in the possession of these two individuals.

"When the FBI was given that information, the phone records of these people allowed them to connect three previously unlinked terrorist investigations. The FBI in Providence admitted that

without this tip from the police, this lead probably never would have been developed, and even if it could have been developed, it might have taken them three years of just continually working this case.

"Meanwhile, we've started targeting some of the industries and some of the private businesses in Rhode Island that might be compromised by terrorists or used by terrorists as fronts, or as fund raising operations. Through this training, we are uncovering some terrorist ties, and uncovering some possible fund raising schemes, and some very good money-laundering schemes being done by regular criminals."

Conclusion: Blending Counterterrorism into Routine Police Work

Many police chiefs concede that counterterrorism is not a high priority in their jurisdictions. While terrorism is the top law-enforcement priority in New York City, Washington, D.C., and parts of New Jersey, in other areas the threat is less urgent and less defined. In these lower-priority environments especially, but also in the higher-threat areas, police can gain "economies of preparedness" by building counterterrorism into their routine work. Every citizen-police interaction is an opportunity to pursue anomalies by asking the next question. Every training session provides a way to impart awareness. Merging law enforcement and counterterrorism in this way can not only make our states and cities safer, but can also save them money.

The New Jersey State Police trains its police helicopter pilots, for instance, in a way that serves a counterterrorist purpose. The practice evolved from a need to economize. "We were going broke on homeland security issues in the State of New Jersey," a colonel in the state police explains.

It was costing us a quarter-million dollars a day every time Tom Ridge put us at level orange; and if you add the National Guard, it was \$300,000 a day. More importantly, it dragged troopers away from assignments at our road stations, and we had a lot of territory to cover.

As a result of that, we did some reorganizing. We formed the Homeland Security branch, and we moved 1,000 people into it. Within this branch we put all the communication elements of the organization, our SWAT unit, aviation, the marine police, bomb, arson—all of those type units are now located under one unified chain of command.

We wove counterterrorism into their day-to-day routine. Instead of doing training helicopter flights just anywhere, to obtain the hours required for certification, they fly their training maneuvers over critical infrastructure targets that might interest terrorists—railroad facilities, New Jersey Transit, and the stretch of nuclear facilities and tank farms that some have called "the two most dangerous miles in America."

In other words, if we have to get the helicopters up in the air anyway, even if it's just in training, then we might as well do something that serves a larger preventive purpose.

Counterterrorism, under this model, is not necessarily a separate function, requiring separate new staff or creation of a unit that's going to do counterterrorism only. "It's about getting everybody involved at some level," Tim Connors explains. Maintaining that involvement is the key to maintaining our vigilance, in a world in where terrorism will, we hope, remain rare.



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