Governance, Economics Corporate Governance, Shareholder Capitalism
June 30th, 2016 1 Minute Read Report by James R. Copland, Margaret M. O'Keefe

Proxy Monitor 2016 — Finding 3: Political Spending and Lobbying

As June draws to a close, so does corporate America’s 2016 proxy season, when most large publicly traded companies hold annual meetings; at these meetings, corporate shareholders cast votes on ballot items—typically by proxy—considering questions placed on ballots distributed under rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission. This finding explores 2016 shareholder-proposal activism related to political spending and lobbying in historical and recent context.

  • In 2016, a shareholder proposal concerning corporate political spending received majority shareholder support over board opposition—the first such result among 455 such proposals introduced over the last 11 years.
  • There was no overall increase in shareholder support for political-spending-related proposals—notwithstanding increased political pressures.
  • As was the case last year, proposals related to corporate political spending or lobbying were the second-most common class of shareholder proposals introduced in 2016.

READ FULL REPORT AT PROXYMONITOR.ORG

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