Of the many entrenched school customs
that have been reconsidered and reformed
over the past decade, social promotion has
been among the most resistant to change.
Holding children back in the same grade
has long been frowned upon, and a large
body of research seems to support that
point of view: retained students tend to
have lower test scores and are allegedly
more likely to drop out than students who
initially performed at an equally low level
but were nevertheless promoted.
Despite the old habits and the old research, however, school districts across the nation
have been slowly but steadily bucking convention. Several large systems, including
Chicago (beginning in 1996), New York (2004), and Philadelphia (2005), now require
students in particular grades to demonstrate a benchmark level of mastery in basic skills
on a standardized test before they can be promoted. Florida (2002) and Texas (2002)
have taken the lead among states in forbidding social promotions. In 2000, the most
recent year for which national enrollment data are available, these five school systems
alone enrolled nearly 20 percent of the nations 3rd-grade students. (For more on
Chicagos policy, see Alexander Russo, “Retaining Retention,” features, Winter 2005;
and Robin Tepper Jacob and Susan Stone, “Teachers and Students Speak,” features,
Winter 2005.)
But is this new approach to grade promotion effective? And what about those studies that
say retention doesnt work? Proponents of the new programs believe that schools do
students no favor by promoting them if they dont have the skills to succeed at a higher
level. But because these arguments, however plausible, have little research to support
them, we set out to determine if they have scientific merit. Our findings from Florida
suggest that the use of standardized testing policies to end social promotion can help lowperforming
students make modest improvements in reading and substantial
improvements in math.
Floridas Program to End Social Promotion
Over the past several years Florida has attempted substantial reforms of its struggling
public school system, the fourth-largest in the country and one that consistently ranks
close to the bottom on academic indicators, including high-school graduation rates and
scores on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). The Sunshine State
had instituted school voucher programs, increased the number of charter schools, and devised a sophisticated accountability system that evaluates schools on the basis of their
progress as measured by the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT). But in
May 2002, the state legislature made one of its boldest moves, revising the School Code,
the states education law, to require 3rd-grade students to score at the Level-2 benchmark
or above on the reading portion of the FCAT in order to be promoted to 4th grade.
The hurdle created for students was not terribly high. The states department of education
describes a student who scores at Level 2 (of five levels) as having “limited success”
against the state standards; only students who score at Level 3 or above are considered to
be proficient for the purposes of evaluating schools under No Child Left Behind. Even so,
roughly 24 percent of 3rd graders tested in Florida in 2001–02, the year before the
retention policy was introduced, performed below Level 2. This number fell slightly, to
22 percent, in the 2002–03 academic year.
Not all these students were retained, however, even after the policy change. The law
allowed for exceptions to the retention policy if a student had limited English proficiency
or a severe disability, scored above the 51st percentile on the Stanford-9 standardized
test, had demonstrated proficiency through a performance portfolio, or had already been
held back for two years. Altogether, roughly 40 percent of the 3rd-grade students who
scored below the Level-2 threshold in 2002–03 were promoted.
The Problem with Earlier Studies
Traditionally, the retention of a student, uncommon as it was, resulted from an individual
teachers assessment of the students ability to succeed at the next level. But such teacher
discretion, while arguably desirable as a matter of policy, is the primary reason earlier
studies of social promotion are flawed. We must assume from studying those retention
programs, which are still the predominant practice in schools throughout the United
States, that students who were held back were fundamentally different from students who
were promoted. Because teachers were considering intangible factors, even when race,
gender, family income, and academic achievement are the same, there was no way to
isolate the effect of being held back, much less to make reasonable conclusions about the
effects of retention on a students academic achievement or the probability of his
dropping out of high school. Are students who were retained less likely to graduate
because they were retained? Or were they retained because of characteristics that also
predisposed them to drop out? Because the retention policies were subjective, we will
simply never know.
There are also reasons to believe that subjective retention policies affect students
differently than policies that use promotion criteria like performance on standardized
tests. If promotion depends on an individual teachers assessment of a child, then that
child is not likely to know what he or she must do to avoid being held back. Also, if few
students were being held back, then those students might perform worse because they felt
excluded and inferior. A policy that holds back thousands of students might dilute this
sense of being singled out. Finally, subjective assessments of students are vulnerable to
inappropriate influences, including teachers prejudices and pressure brought by parents,
in ways that objective criteria of performance might inhibit.
Implementing objective standards, even if they were accompanied by subjective
exemptions, might significantly change the effects of retention in ways that previous
research could not anticipate or measure. For research purposes, objective retention
policies also create a useful comparison group of students not subject to retention. In the
case of Floridas program to end social promotion, for example, we can compare students
who were subject to the threat of retention with students who would have been had they
been born a year later.
What a Difference a Year Makes
To determine the impact of ending social promotion for 3rd graders in Florida, we
compared low-scoring 3rd graders in 2002, the first students to be subject to the program,
with low-scoring 3rd graders from the previous year. Of the 43,996 3rd graders in 2002
for whom we have valid test scores on both FCAT math and reading assessments, 60
percent were actually retained. By contrast, of the 45,401 3rd graders in 2001 for whom
we have valid test scores, only 9 percent were retained. Our analysis assumes that the
students from the two school years should be similar in all respects except for the year in
which they happened to have been born. We analyzed the test-score improvements made
between each students first 3rd-grade year and the following year on both the states
own accountability exam and the Stanford-9, a nationally normed exam administered at
the same time as the FCAT but not used for accountability purposes.
We measure FCAT performance using developmental-scale scores, which allow us to
compare the test-score gains of all the students in our study, even though they took tests
designed for different grade levels. Developmental-scale scores are designed to measure
academic proficiency on a single scale for students of any grade and in any year. For
example, a 3rd grader with a developmental-scale score of 1,000 and a 4th grader with a
developmental-scale score of 1,000 have the same level of academic achievement; if a
student gets a developmental-scale score of 1,000 in 2001 and then gets the same score of
1,000 in 2002, this indicates that the student has not made any academic progress in the
intervening year. The developmental-scale scores required to reach Level 2 on the FCAT
reading test were consistent for each years cohort.
We began by measuring the effect on all low-scoring 3rd graders of simply having been
subject to the new policy. That is, we did not distinguish in our initial analysis between
students who were actually retained and those who received an exemption and were
promoted to the next grade. This analysis provides an estimate of the average impact of
the policy change on all students in the state performing below the Level-2 benchmark. It
also allows for the possibility that exempted students enjoyed spillover benefits from the
retention policy, since they were now being instructed in a system in which fewer
students in 4th grade were unprepared to do grade-level work.
To identify the policys average impact, we compared the gains in developmental-scale
scores made by students who first entered 3rd grade in 2002 and scored below the FCAT
benchmark with gains made by students who first entered 3rd grade in 2001 and scored
below the FCAT benchmark. In making this comparison, we took into account other
factors that could affect achievement gains, such as the students race, whether the
student received a free or reduced-price school lunch, whether the student was deemed
Limited English Proficient, and the students precise test score during his first 3rd-grade
year. With these differences accounted for, the only distinction between the two groups
of students was assumed to be that the former group entered the school system a year
later and was therefore subject to the new policy in 3rd grade.
As discussed above, however, many low-scoring 3rd graders were granted exemptions
and promoted to the 4th grade even under the new policy. We therefore also evaluated the
effect of actually being retained, again controlling for race, eligibility for free or reducedprice
lunch, English proficiency, and baseline test scores. In conducting this analysis, we
also needed to account for the fact that the students who were held back were a select
group of students who could differ in important ways from the promoted students.
Presumably, teachers and other decisionmakers expected these students, unlike promoted
students, to benefit from an additional year as 3rd graders. Fortunately, the fact that
simply having entered school a year later increased the probability of retention for all
low-scoring students again provides a way around this obvious selection problem. In
essence, the statistical method we use compares those retained students that our data
suggest would not have been retained the previous year with a comparable group of
students who were not retained. Our results therefore indicate the effect of retention on
those students who were held back as a result of the new policy.
During this time, Florida was engaged in other education reforms as well: instituting
several school-voucher programs, increasing the number of charter schools in the state,
and improving the system used to assign grades to schools based on the FCAT. However,
it is reasonable to assume that whatever effect these other policies have on our analyses is
minor. In order for the existence of another policy to affect our results significantly, we
would have to believe that the program substantially improved the education of the 3rd
graders in 2002–03 without having a similar effect on the previous years cohort.
Moreover, while a sudden policy change could conceivably explain the overall
improvements between the two cohorts, it is difficult to see how such a change could
cause substantially larger gains among those students actually retained.
Retention Works
Our fundamental findings from an analysis of the 3rd- and 4th-grade data for these two
years indicate that the performance of students identified for retention, regardless of
whether they were retained or exempted and promoted, exceeded the performance of
low-performing students from the previous year who were not subject to the retention
policy; and students who were actually retained made the larger relative gains.
Students identified for retention by the Florida policy gained 0.06 of a standard deviation
in reading on both the FCAT and Stanford-9 over equally low-performing 3rd graders
from the previous school year (see Figure 1). In math, students identified for retention
surpassed low performers who were not subject to the policy by 0.15 standard deviations
(4.8 percentiles) on the FCAT and 0.14 standard deviations (4.4 percentiles) on the
Stanford-9.
Students who were actually retained experienced even larger relative improvements (see
Figure 2). Retained students performed better than low-scoring students who were
promoted by 0.13 standard deviations (4.10 percentiles) on the FCAT and 0.11 standard
deviations (3.45 percentiles) on the Stanford-9 in reading. In math retained students
improved 0.30 standard deviations (10.0 percentiles) on the FCAT and 0.28 standard
deviations (9.3 percentiles) on the Stanford-9 over promoted students.
Some critics of the new retention policies argued that teachers and schools would respond
to them by manipulating test scores, either directly by cheating or indirectly by teaching
students skills that would help them to improve their test scores but would not provide
real academic proficiency. This argument would have merit only if we found strong gains
on the high-stakes FCAT and no similar gains on the low-stakes Stanford-9, for which
there is no incentive to manipulate scores. But our results are consistent between the
FCAT and the Stanford-9, indicating that there have been no serious manipulations of the
high-stakes testing system. If teachers are in fact changing their curricula with the intent
to “teach to” the FCAT, they are doing so in ways that also contribute to gains on the
highly respected Stanford-9. This would indicate that teachers have made changes
resulting in real increases in students proficiency.
An unexpected benefit of the retention policy is the improvement in math scores. This
might seem odd, given that it is the reading portion of the FCAT that students must pass
to earn promotion and that the rhetoric supporting Floridas retention program
emphasizes that it will improve student literacy. Of course, the math gains could simply
reflect the fact that math skills are learned primarily in schools, while reading is practiced
both in and outside of school. For this reason, evaluations of school reforms frequently
find stronger effects in math than in reading. Alternatively, it may be that students who
were retained specifically because of their poor reading skills are particularly poor in that
subject and that this limits their room for improvement.
We also explored the possibility that the objective retention program could have different
effects on students of different races. Our results show gains of similar sizes by the three
racial groups for which we have an adequate sample size to have reasonable confidence
in our findings: white, black, and Hispanic. The exception is for whites performance on
the FCAT reading test. It is difficult for us to interpret why white students would fail to
benefit from the retention policy as measured by the FCAT reading test but would be
shown to benefit as measured by the Stanford-9 reading test.
Our results also suggest that low-scoring Florida 3rd graders who were given an
exemption and promoted might have benefited from another year in the 3rd grade. This
does not mean that it would be wise to eliminate all exemptions to the testing
requirement. There are certainly students for whom testing is either inappropriate or
whose performance on other academic measures could reasonably indicate that they
would be better served by moving on to the next grade. However, our findings do
indicate that teachers and school systems should be cautious when granting exemptions.
What It Means
At first glance our findings seem inconsistent with evaluations of Chicagos program
ending social promotion, to our knowledge the only similarly designed retention policy to
be evaluated using comparable methods. In Chicago, students in the 3rd, 6th, and 8th
grades must exceed benchmarks on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS), a respected
standardized test, in order to be promoted to the next grade. In a study conducted in 2004
by scholars at the Consortium on Chicago School Research, the performance of 3rd- and
6th-grade students who scored just below the benchmark on the ITBS, most of whom
were retained because of the mandate, was compared with the performance of students
who scored just above the benchmark, most of whom were promoted. The Chicago
researchers were able to measure test-score performance for two years after
implementation of the program. They found benefits from the program after one year,
similar to what we found in Florida, but discovered that those benefits went away after
the second year. Third-grade students were not affected, and 6th-grade students were
negatively affected by the policy in their performance on the ITBS reading test. The
findings on the Chicago retention program emphasize the importance of following the
progress of retained students in Florida over time.
Still, the Chicago policy differs from Floridas in some respects. In 1999 the Chicago
policy stopped allowing students to be retained twice, which Floridas policy does allow.
This difference might reduce teachers motivation to work with already retained students,
whom they now can expect to be promoted the next year regardless of their performance.
Other programs with different and more stable retention policies might show different
results.
Finally, while our study provides valuable information about the effectiveness of
Floridas policy to end social promotion, it does not offer a full catalog of the policys
benefits or of its potential costs. It will be some time before we can examine whether
retention increased or reduced the probability of dropping out of school later on. Most
important, it does not provide any information about the programs effects on students
academic progress the first time they were in 3rd grade. The policys greatest benefits
could result not from retention itself, but rather from increased efforts on the part of
teachers and even students to avoid being retained in the first place.
Original Source: https://66.234.233.53/owa/redir.aspx?C=7a349f46269b47ac9ffd40a2ce5ac797&URL=http%3a%2f%2fwww.manhattan-institute.org%2fpdf%2f_ednext_06-GettingAhead.pdf