| Table 1: Effect of Voucher Competition on Public School Performance |
| |
Distance to Nearest Voucher School with Same Grade Level* |
Number of Voucher Schools with Same Grade Level Within One-Mile Radius |
Distance to Nearest Voucher School with Same Grade Level* |
Number of Voucher Schools with Same Grade Level Within One-Mile Radius |
|
Grade 3
|
|
Unstandardized Coefficient
|
-0.456
|
-0.344
|
-0.772
|
-0.45
|
|
Standard Error
|
4.59
|
1.05
|
4.232
|
0.965
|
|
N
|
104
|
104
|
103
|
103
|
|
Grade 5
|
|
Unstandardized Coefficient
|
-0.655
|
1.186
|
1.95
|
0.172
|
|
Standard Error
|
3.285
|
0.746
|
2.865
|
0.668
|
|
N
|
103
|
103
|
103
|
103
|
|
Grade 8
|
|
Unstandardized Coefficient
|
-3.982
|
0.905
|
-5.587
|
1.545
|
|
Standard Error
|
2.45
|
0.655
|
4.717
|
1.244
|
|
N
|
26
|
26
|
26
|
26
|
|
Grade 10
|
|
Unstandardized Coefficient
|
-0.177
|
-1.591
|
0.019
|
3.579
|
|
Standard Error
|
2.611
|
2.704
|
2.592
|
2.682
|
|
N
|
19
|
19
|
19
|
19
|
| (controlling for percentage of students who are white, percentage of students enrolled in the free or reduced-price lunch program, and baseline 2004 test score in same grade and subject) |
| *In the distance analyses, a negative coefficient indicates that public schools nearer to the closest voucher school make the largest gains. Thus, a negative coefficient is most consistent with the hypothesis that voucher competition has improved public school performance in Washington, D.C. |