No. 67 March 2012
DUES AND DEEP POCKETS:
Public-Sector Unions' Money Machine
Daniel DiSalvo, Senior Fellow, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research
PRESS RELEASE >>
IN THE NEWS
Report says unions have big money advantage in
politics, The Sacramento Bee, 3-26-12
Public Sector Unions Spend $4.0 Billion per Year in U.S., Union Watch, 3-23-12
Public-sector unions using dues to fight political assaults,
Wisconsin Reporter, 3-21-12
TMJ4 NBC's "Fourth and State" 3-22-12 - Watch the segment
WGDJ 1300 AM’s “Live from the State Capitol” 4-2-12
WSAU 550AM's "Wisconsin Morning News," 03-27-12
WSAU 99.9FM's "The Pat Snyder Show," 03-27-12
KMJ 580 AM's "The Ray Appleton Show," 03-27-12
WIBA 1310's "Vicki McKenna Show," 03-21-12
|Table of Contents:
|About the Author
|The "Free Rider" Problem
|The Agency Shop
|Money in Politics
At first glance, public-sector labor unions are just one of many types of organizations that participate in the political
process. However, these unions differ significantly from other interest groups made up of individual citizens (such as
the NRA or the Sierra Club) or non-labor organizations (such as the Chamber of Commerce or the Motion Picture
Association of America). Because their members’ interests are tied to government policy, these unions are more focused
and vigilant in their drive to influence policy than other groups are. And they have immense financial resources to
deploy: in 25 U.S. states, laws guarantee unions both members and revenue.
The unions are assured of members by “agency shop” laws, which require workers covered by collective-bargaining
agreements, even if they decline to join the union involved, to pay an “agency fee” for its representation. The effect
of agency-shop laws is to push workers to join unions. Only a small minority of workers, who oppose joining on
principle, are left outside the union fold.
Public-sector unions are assured of funds by “dues checkoff” rules, which require governments to withhold union dues
from their employees and pay the money directly to their unions. This guarantees an abundant and reliable source of
money, sparing unions the need to spend resources on recruitment, retention, and fund-raising.
As a result, public-sector unions bring vast resources to their political activities at the federal, state, and local levels.
They make direct donations to candidates and parties, fund issue ads in parallel campaigns, provide get-out-the-vote
ground operations, run campaigns for and against ballot measures, and engage in extensive lobbying efforts.
Public-sector unions also differ from most interest groups in their allegiance to a single party and a single agenda in
debates about the role of government. They are focused on a few key issues relating to the government jobs of their
members: more government employment and thus higher taxes and more government services. They consistently
favor referenda that increase taxation and government spending. And public-sector unions give money, volunteers,
and other support almost exclusively to candidates of the Democratic party.
A number of states are currently struggling with controversies over public-sector unions’ impact at the bargaining
table on matters such as health-care costs, pensions, performance pay, and worker flexibility. But unions may have
more impact on public policy—and the costs of government—through their uniquely powerful tools for electioneering
and lobbying. Today’s debates should expand their focus from collective-bargaining issues to take into account these
facts about public-sector unions as political actors.
About the Author
DANIEL DISALVO is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute’s Center for State and Local Leadership and an assistant
professor of political science at The City College of New York. He received his doctorate in politics from the University
of Virginia and was previously Andrew W. Mellon Visiting Professor at Amherst College. He is the author of Engines
of Change: Party Faction in American Politics, 1868-2010 (Oxford). His work focuses on American political parties,
elections, labor unions, state government, and public policy. He has written on these topics for both scholarly and
popular publications, including National Affairs, The Public Interest, The Weekly Standard, Commentary, the New York
Daily News, the New York Post, The Forum: A Journal of Applied Research in Contemporary Politics, The Tocqueville
Review, Congress & the Presidency, and The Journal of Policy History.
In Wisconsin last year, public-sector labor unions spent over
$25 million in political campaigns to derail reform of collectivebargaining
arrangements for government employees. With a
recall election this year aimed at the architect of the reforms,
Governor Scott Walker, unions are poised to spend millions more
to align the state’s politics with their interests. In Ohio, meanwhile,
opponents of a similar reform raised over $42 million for a successful
referendum campaign to repeal that state’s new law. Most of that
money came from public-sector unions (with teachers’ unions
alone providing some $9.7 million). In these and other states,
attention has focused on how collective-bargaining agreements
affect governmental operations. But how unions influence political
outcomes is equally, if not more, important. Public-sector unions
are not simply one more interest group, jostling with others in
Madisonian competition to be heard. The American public-sector
union is an interest group unlike any other, engaged in lobbying,
advocacy, and campaign work (almost always for Democrats) with
a unique money supply.
Recent union-related political battles in Wisconsin, Ohio, California,
New York, New Jersey, and Illinois have offered many reminders
that public-sector unions are among the most powerful players in
American politics. For instance, many interest groups oppose school
voucher programs, which would allow parents to spend public
education funds in schools of their choice, public or private. Yet
whenever voucher measures have appeared on the ballot (either statewide, as in California, or in local school district
elections), virtually all the money spent to defeat them
has come from teachers’ unions. As the Wisconsin
and Ohio battles illustrate, government unions have
immense amounts of money at their disposal; in
many states, this income is practically guaranteed by
law. That money supply is the key source of unions’
remarkable political power—power that may well
have more impact on government operations than the
collective-bargaining arrangements that have been the
focus of reform efforts.
Public-employee unions are so active because
government workers have a direct stake in many
aspects of public policy. Their day-to-day lives are
affected directly by what government does and how
it does it. Most other citizens don’t feel the impact
of government policy in the same way. So, while
taxpayers and businesses give fleeting attention to
many issues, public-sector unions have a powerful
incentive to remain mobilized, vigilant, and prepared
to invest major resources in politics.
To become such political powerhouses, government
unions need more than focus: they need members and
money. Their special ability to access these resources,
the source of their exceptional political power, is the
subject of this report.
The "Free Rider" Problem
Any interest group (the National Rifle Association,
for instance, or the Sierra Club) must overcome
the individual citizen’s incentive to “free
ride”—to let others pay the costs of an organization,
while enjoying the benefits that that organization
provides. For example, we all benefit from breathing
clean air. Therefore, we all have some incentive to
form an organization to promote air quality. However,
those who let others rent the office space, hire the
staff, and otherwise do the work will benefit from
clean air without having to spend any of their own
time or money.
To counteract this incentive, interest groups proffer
some combination of solidarity (“we’re all in this noble cause together”), ideology (“we must act on
our beliefs”), and economic incentives (“we get these
concrete benefits for joining”). These groups must
then devote considerable resources to spreading their
message, recruiting members, and getting money from
them. That’s the job of staff skilled at identifying people
who care intensely enough about gun rights and the
environment to join the NRA or the Sierra Club and
donate money. Without this ceaseless work, the normal
American interest group would fold.
In 25 American states, public-sector unions operate
without this imperative. Instead, they use the law to
require all workers in a bargaining unit to join unions
or at least pay something to support them. Under the
laws of these states, by a majority vote, government
employees can force all their colleagues to make a
union their “exclusive representative.” Even employees
who refuse to join the union can be legally obligated
to contribute money. In addition, public-sector unions
employ all the standard interest-group methods to
attract members, adding additional incentives on top
of the legal pressure to sign up. (Indeed, many public
servants tell pollsters that they joined their union
mainly for concrete benefits, such as extra insurance.)
Two legal provisions confer this unique advantage on
The Agency Shop
The first provision is the “agency shop,” which
stipulates that because a union represents all
workers in collective bargaining, nonunion
workers must pay “agency” fees to the union. Often,
these fees are very close to the amount paid by members
as union dues. In some jurisdictions, nonunion workers
may recoup some of their agency fees, on the grounds
that they should pay only for collective-bargaining
services, not the union’s other activities. But exercising
this “clawback” is often laborious, and the amounts
returned can be quite small.
Employees, who know that they will be charged fees
comparable with dues, have little motive to avoid
joining the union—especially since members, for the same payments, also get tangible benefits, such as
dental insurance or legal services. The few workers
who refuse are those who are strongly opposed on
principle. Yet there is evidence that these stubborn
holdouts have many colleagues who would join them
if the rules were not rigged. Indeed, the contrast is
striking between agency-shop states and the 23 other
states whose right-to-work laws ban the practice. In
nearly every state that permits agency fees, more than
90 percent of teachers belong to unions. In states that
don’t allow agency fees, only 68 percent of teachers
are unionized. Political scientist Terry Moe has found
that the presence of agency fees made it 20 percent
more likely that teachers would join a union. Results
are similar for other public servants.
Of course, public employees have, and should have, the
constitutional right to join organizations that give them
a voice and represent their interests. Even in right-towork
states, many public employees still voluntarily join
unions. Indeed, it is possible to be a right-to-work state
with collective-bargaining laws, whose unions have only
voluntary members. Such states include Florida, North
Dakota, and Nebraska. Even in Virginia and Texas,
where agency shops and collective bargaining with
government workers are prohibited, some workers still
voluntarily join unions. In the states with agency-shop
laws, however, all workers in unionized workplaces
end up giving material support to unions, regardless
of their personal wishes.
The second legal provision that benefits publicsector
unions is the “dues checkoff,” where
the government withholds a portion of public
employees’ salaries to pay union dues or agency fees.
With a dues checkoff, workers never actually see the
money that goes into union coffers. Unions have
long argued that this eliminates free-riding (workers
benefiting from union representation without paying
for it), but it also eliminates workers’ choices about
how to spend that portion of their pay.
In the absence of a dues checkoff, workers might,
for example, elect to remodel their homes or take the family to Disneyland. Before recent changes in
Wisconsin law ended the dues checkoff for publicemployee
unions, teachers there paid as much as
$1,100 a year in union dues. According to Joseph
Tanner, city manager of Vallejo (a city of some 116,000
people northeast of San Francisco), in 2007 each of
the city’s 100 firefighters paid $230 a month in dues,
and each of the 140 police officers paid $254 a month.
Hence, unlike other interest groups, the firefighters’
union had a guaranteed annual revenue stream of
$276,000, and the police union was assured of $426,720
a year. This funding base made both groups powerful
forces in the politics of the city. In 2008, Vallejo, faced
with soaring public-employee compensation costs and
falling revenue, declared bankruptcy.
Where they can rely on dues checkoff, public-sector
unions need spend very little on fund-raising—a
staffer or two is sufficient to process checks from the
government. Resources are thus available for politics
that equivalent groups would devote to identifying
supporters and persuading them to give money.
Unlike other interest groups, public-sector unions
enjoy a uniquely reliable revenue stream to support
their political activities. Unsurprisingly, some of
the resulting political power has been mustered
to preserve the dues checkoff. Unions are right to
consider any proposed reform as a threat to their
interests. George Will reports: “After Colorado in 2001
required public employees unions to have annual
votes reauthorizing collection of dues, membership in
the Colorado Association of Public Employees declined
70 percent. In 2005, Indiana stopped collecting dues
from unionized public employees; in 2011, there are
90 percent fewer dues-paying members. In Utah, the
end of automatic dues deductions for political activities
in 2001 caused teachers’ payments to fall 90 percent.
After a similar law passed in 1992 in Washington State,
the percentage of teachers making such contributions
declined from 82 to 11.”
The advantages that public-sector unions gain through
agency shops and dues checkoffs were on display
in last year’s highest-profile political battles over
collective bargaining by government employees. In
Wisconsin and Ohio, Republican-majority legislatures passed, and governors signed, legislation reforming
government labor relations. Among the specific
provisions, the measures sought to restrict the subjects
of collective bargaining for most public workers and
eliminate government’s collection of union dues.
In response, the public-sector unions—throughout the
United States, not just those in Wisconsin and Ohio—
summoned vast resources in an effort to stop the
legislation, and, after that failed, to repeal it. In Ohio,
opponents of the legal changes spent an impressive
$42 million in a referendum campaign to overturn the
newly minted law (SB5) (Chart 1). They succeeded,
having outspent supporters three-to-one and having
fielded a stronger get-out-the-vote operation on Election
Day. Most of the money to fuel this political muscle
came from unions. Indeed, 98 percent of the anti-SB5
campaign cash in some reporting periods came from
unions (both public-sector and private-industry), rather
than from individuals. The teachers’ unions alone gave over $9 million, which is half of what Governor John
Kasich spent on his entire 2010 election campaign (Chart
2). In contrast, the supporters of SB5 were a blend of
individuals and business interests.
In Wisconsin, the unions and their allies first sought to
stop the bill’s passage by mounting massive protests
in Madison and a major advertising campaign in
which they outspent supporters for the “budget repair
bill” $3.37 million to $2.26 million. After the bill
passed, opponents sued to stop its implementation. In
connection with their legal strategy, they spent another
$1.5 million on a state supreme court election in hopes
of improving the high court’s reception of their case.
This approach failed: the incumbent, whom they
correctly presumed would vote to uphold the law, won
reelection, and the state’s supreme court dismissed
the suit. Unions then spent over $20 million trying to
recall six state senators in order to retake control of
the upper chamber (Chart 3.) (The amount that the
unions spent on the six recall elections was more than
half the amount spent on all state senate elections in
2010.) Since the law’s implementation, unions have
continued their electoral attack by enlisting 30,000
organizers to collect a million signatures supporting
an election to recall Governor Walker. They are now
gearing up for a bruising electoral battle, when they
will spend millions in an effort to unseat the governor.
Money in Politics
As Wisconsin’s and Ohio’s recent histories vividly
demonstrate, a large and secure revenue stream
turns public-employee unions into potent
political organizations. Union political efforts take place
at all three levels of government: federal, state, and
local. They make direct donations to candidates and
parties, fund issue ads in parallel campaigns, provide
get-out-the-vote ground operations, run campaigns for
and against ballot measures, and engage in extensive
lobbying efforts. They overwhelmingly support
Democratic candidates and consistently favor referenda
that increase taxation and government spending. It is
important to measure how much money public-sector
unions have for political action and precisely where
that money is spent.
Labor unions are required to divulge their revenue
streams in financial reports that they must file with
the U.S. Department of Labor. In 2010, the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME) reported an income of $211,806,537; the
National Education Association (a major teachers’
union) received $397,953,771; and Service Employees
International Union received $318,755,793. Unions
are not required to detail how they spend their
income, making it difficult to assess how much of
any given union’s revenue it devotes to lobbying and
electioneering. Some unions, however, have issued
their own estimates of how much of their dues they
spend on political activities that advance their interests.
From such statements, one rough but reasonable rule
of thumb is that public-sector unions tend to spend
about 20 percent of their dues on lobbying and
electioneering. This estimate is derived from what
unions say on disclosure forms to their members, what
union leaders say publicly, and what various analysts
Using this estimate, we can arrive at some rough
metrics by calculating the total number of union
members and agency-fee payers and the average
paid by each worker. Consider all of California’s
public-sector unions combined: they have about 1
million workers, with an estimated annual average
dues per person of $500. If they spend 20 percent of those funds on politics, they have about $120
million to devote annually to influence federal, state,
and local politics.
Where does that money go? Spending on lobbying is
not easy to track at the federal level, and even more
difficult at the state and local levels. Furthermore, while
there are good data on federal and state elections, most
watchdog groups do not track local elections, where
unions have the most at stake (because the majority of
union members are employed by local governments).
In addition, it is often hard to identify clearly the source
of donations that have been funneled through Political
Action Committees and similar organizations. Finally,
government unions make many in-kind contributions,
such as phone banks, office space, and volunteers, that
are hard to quantify (and easily understated).
On the other hand, some forms of political spending
can be quantified: unions are required to spell out
the amounts they give directly to state and federal
candidates, as well as money they spend on issue
ads and expenses devoted to lobbying. The National
Institute on Money in State Politics data show that
in 2010, across all states, public-sector unions spent
about $150 million—up from $130 million in 2008 and
$118 million in 2006. In 2010, unions gave Democratic
candidates $86,641,325 and spent $53,663,888 on ballot
measures; the rest (less than 10 percent of the total)
went to Republicans and third-party candidates. This
means that public-sector unions were in the top five
biggest-spending interest groups trying to influence
politics at the state level.
Public-sector union spending is highly uneven across
the states, reflecting the difference between agencyshop
jurisdictions and those without these laws.
Public-sector unions were the third-largest spender
in California’s state elections ($45,730,777), after Meg
Whitman, the Republican nominee, who self-financed
her gubernatorial campaign, and electric utility
companies, which spent $50,949,029. Labor unions
(mostly public but some private) spent $23,791,657
on independent expenditures during the campaign
cycle—far more than any other group. California
permits agency shops and has a strong publicemployee
In contrast, Texas prohibits collective bargaining in
the public sector and is a right-to-work state. There,
in 2010, public-sector unions did not even rank in the
top 15 largest contributors, and labor in general spent
only $97,624 on political action. Florida is somewhere
between California and Texas: it allows collective
bargaining in government but forbids agency shops.
There, public-sector unions were the fourth-largest spenders ($11,362,386) after self-financing candidates,
trial lawyers, and real-estate and insurance groups.
Florida labor’s independent expenditures were a
modest $1,638,101. (See Charts 4–6 for patterns of
giving in California [2004-09], Texas [2002-10], and
The 2002 Florida gubernatorial election is an instructive
example of the political clout that derives from
abundant and secure sources of money. That year,
Jeb Bush had finished his first term as governor and,
along with the Republican legislature, had enacted an
innovative education program, authorizing vouchers
and creating new ways to hold teachers accountable
for results. The Florida Education Association (FEA)
responded by campaigning successfully to deny former
U.S. attorney general Janet Reno the Democratic
gubernatorial nomination, winning it instead for the group’s preferred candidate, political neophyte
Bill McBride. In the general election, the FEA spent
millions of dollars and its political operatives actually
ran McBride’s campaign. Not surprisingly, McBride’s
platform was to roll back Bush’s education reforms.
McBride lost. But the fact that he had, with no previous
political experience, become a major-party candidate
challenging a popular incumbent from one of the
nation’s great political dynasties is a testimony to the
power of public-sector unions—even in Florida, whose
labor laws are not strongly pro-union.
A look at the federal level provides another way to
appreciate the scope and magnitude of government
unions’ political activity. Most public-sector unions
represent state and local workers—state and local
officials, not members of Congress, make most
policies affecting them. Nonetheless, six of the top
15 biggest donors to federal political campaigns from
1989 to 2012, according to the Center for Responsive
Politics, were government workers’ unions or unions
with large number of public employees (Table 1).
AFSCME was the third-largest donor, and SEIU, half
of whose 2.2 million members are public employees,
was fifth on the list. The NEA ranked sixth, and the
American Federation of Teachers (AFT) 11th. The Communications Workers of America, with about 20
percent of its membership in government workers,
was 13th. It is important to note that on most policies
related to government spending and taxation, all
these unions are allies, not competitors. In contrast,
business groups’ interests in tax and spending policy
vary considerably and occasionally conflict.
At the federal level, as in individual states, publicemployee
union political spending is closely aligned
with the Democratic Party (see Charts 4–7). Some
98 percent of AFSCME donations and 95 percent of
SEIU donations went to Democrats, unlike other big
contributors, such as AT&T, the National Association of
Realtors, or Citigroup, which split their contributions
nearly evenly between Republicans and Democrats.
The partisanship of union contributions helps
explain Democrats’ advantage over Republicans in
contributions from the biggest donors: $1.3 billion
to $844 million over the last 20 years. In general,
Democrats tend to be much more reliant on large
donors, including unions, than their Republican
opponents, who collect far more in small individual
donations. In the 2002 campaign cycle, 64 percent
of individuals contributing less than $200 to federal
candidates, parties, or leadership PACs gave their money to Republicans. In contrast, those contributing
$1 million or more gave 92 percent to Democrats.
In addition to direct donations to candidates, publicsector
unions finance issue ads in parallel campaigns
in federal elections. The SEIU tops the chart of
independent spenders, with $70,479,179 over the last
20 years, followed by the NRA ($58,619,585), AFSCME
($53,447,240), and the AFL-CIO ($40,664,851). These
figures do not include further spending in parallel
campaigns for state and local offices. Making an
aggregate measure, The Wall Street Journal and The
New York Times reported that AFSCME spent $91
million during the 2010 election cycle, while SEIU
spent $44 million and the NEA $40 million. This
was more than the biggest Republican donors—the
Chamber of Commerce and the Crossroads GPS
Between elections, public-sector unions also lobby
federal, state, and local officials. The Center for
Responsive Politics estimates that public-sector unions
spent $144 million from 1998 to 2011 on lobbying the
federal government (Chart 8).
The SEIU spent $60 million to help elect Barack
Obama in 2008. Perhaps not surprisingly, Obama’s
most frequent visitor during his first six months in office was SEIU president Andy Stern. The political
director of SEIU’s Local 1199 in New York City was
appointed to be the White House political director,
and an SEIU lawyer was named to the National Labor
Relations Board. These examples provide a sense
of just how entwined public-sector unions are with
Democratic Party politics and how much influence
they can exercise.
Analysts and activists have focused too
narrowly on the effects of unions’ collective
bargaining on government policy. It may well
be that public-sector unions have achieved more
of their goals—increased wages and benefits, more
government employment, and more government
spending—by their work in the political arena than at
the bargaining table. Automatic members and reliable
money for political activity are the key advantages
that public-sector unions have over most other
interest groups, which underscores the importance
of the agency shop and the dues checkoff to their
ability to defend their interests. Where an agency
shop is permitted or compulsory, economist Henry
Farber finds, public-sector employees’ earnings are
10 percent higher.
Public-sector unions’ political power rarely leads them
to get everything they want—even if they can get a
lot. However, they have been highly successful at
blocking efforts to reform the way government delivers
services. For example, the teachers’ unions have
staunchly opposed competition in the form of vouchers
and charter schools, transparency, and performance
pay, while assiduously protecting underperforming
teachers. There is little doubt that these political
stances have an impact on government’s effectiveness
and efficiency. For example, Stanford University
economist Eric Hanushek found that replacing the
bottom 5 percent of American teachers with merely
average instructors would catapult the United States
to the top of the international educational rankings.
Even if agency-shop provisions were eliminated,
public employees’ First Amendment rights would
remain intact. They could still band together to press
for better pay, benefits, and working conditions—as
they do in such states as Texas and Virginia. But like
other interest groups, they would have to persuade
people to join voluntarily and would have to solve the
free-rider problem for themselves, rather than counting
on the government to do it for them.
To level the playing field between governmentemployee
unions and taxpayers, elimination of dues
checkoff and the agency shop are possible steps to
take. In fact, these may be more politically palatable,
and ultimately more effective, avenues of reform than
are restrictions on collective bargaining. Eliminating
the public-sector union’s money advantage would
let workers retain their right to negotiate with their
employers but put them on a level playing field in
the political arena. It is the way to restore fairness to
- Jordan Rau, “Powerful Teachers Union Is in the Thick of Ballot Measures,” Los Angeles Times, September 28, 2005.
- Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1965).
- James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations, rev. ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
- In National Labor Relations Board v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734 (1963), the Supreme Court determined that
workers cannot be forced to join unions and outlawed the “closed shop.” However, the Court held that it is still
constitutional for unions to require contributions to their coffers, even if they cannot require contributing workers
to become union members.
- The U.S. Supreme Court has held that agency fees can be assessed only to cover the expenses of collective
bargaining, not political activity. See Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
- Terry M. Moe, Special Interest: Teachers Unions and America’s Public Schools (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 2011), 52, and nn. 42, 420.
- Christian Schneider, “It’s Working in Wisconsin,” City Journal 22, no. 1 (winter 2012): 54.
- George F. Will, “Pension Time Bomb,” Washington Post, February 11, 2008.
- Idem, “Liberals’ Wisconsin Waterloo,” Washington Post, August 24, 2011.
- Joe Guillen, “Issue 2 Campaigns Raised More than $50 Million,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 17, 2011; and
Jim Siegel and Joe Vardon, “Unions Spend Big on Issue 2,” Columbus Dispatch, October 28, 2011.
- Molly Bloom and Ida Lieszkovszky, “Educations Unions Raise Much of $19 Million to Defeat Ohio’s Issue 2,” State
Impact, NPR, October 27, 2011, http://stateimpact.npr.org/ohio/2011/10/27/education-unions-push-campaignspending-
- Campaign Media Analysis Group, http://cmagadfacts.tumblr.com.
- Brennan Center for Justice, New York University School of Law , “Special Interest TV Spending in Wisconsin
Supreme Court Race Tops $3 Million,” April 4, 2011, http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/special_
- Shushannah Walshe, “30 Million Pouring in to Influence Wisconsin’s Recall Elections,” ABC News, August 4,
- Monica Davey, “Organizers Say 1 Million Signed Petition to Recall Wisconsin Governor,” New York Times, January
- See U.S. Department of Labor, http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/rrlo/lmrda.htm.
See also www.unionfacts.com.
- See “Public Sector Unions and Political Spending,” September 23, 2010, http://unionwatch.org/public-sectorunions-
political-spending; and Larry Sand, “Teachers’ Union Political Funding Inappropriate,” San Jose Mercury,
July 7, 2010.
- AFSCME’s members pay, on average, $390 a year in dues per member. But the dues for teachers are often as
much as $1,000 per year. So $500 a year seems fair. See Brody Mullins and John McKinnon, “Campaign’s Big
Spender,” Wall Street Journal, October 22, 2010.
- See http://www.followthemoney.org/database/state_overview.phtml?y=2010&s=CA.
- Moe, Special Interest, 296–97.
- See http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/list.php?type=A.
- “Democrats Discovering Campaign Law’s Cost,” Washington Post, June 28, 2003.
- See http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/indexp.php.
- Mullins and McKinnon, “Campaign’s Big Spender”; and Steven Greenhouse, “Union Spends $91 Million on
Midterms,” Caucus–New York Times Blog, October 22, 2010.
- Henry S. Farber, “Union Membership in the United States: The Divergence between the Public and Private
Sectors,” working paper 503, industrial-relations section, Princeton University (September 2005).
- Caroline Minter Hoxby, “How Teachers’ Unions Affect Education Production,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, no. 3 (August 1996): 671–718.
- See Moe, Special Interest, 275–341.
- Eric A. Hanushek, “Teacher Deselection,” in Creating a New Teaching Profession, ed. Dan Goldhaber and Jane
Hannaway (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 2009), 165–80, and (with Kati Haycock), “An Effective
Teacher in Every Classroom: A Lofty Goal, but How to Do It?,” Education Next 10, no. 3 (summer 2010):